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Abstract
This paper empirically analyzes the location decisions of the worlds
major gold mining rms using a data set of political, economic, regulatory,
infrastructural and investment risk variables observed for a large number
of gold producing countries since 1975. The aim of the study is to de-
termine the signicance of environmental stringency in forming location
decisions while controlling for other potentially important variables that
may a¤ect such decisions. Using both a conditional and a mixed logit
regression approach, the study nds consistently strong country location
preferences among multinational gold mining rms. These preferences
paint a picture of an industry attracted to countries that are close to
their head o¢ ce, provide a business environment characterized by low
levels of nancial risk and high levels of political stability and predictabil-
ity in mining operations. While mining rms also appear to be attracted
to countries that have a clean environment is less strong and uniformly
robust. This preference for a clean environment may itself be reective of
the strong desire to go to countries that are e¢ ciently run, provide clear
rules and regulations, and are secure and predictable in their operations.
Moreover, while they prefer to go to countries with low levels of corrup-
tion, this characteristic seems less important than the desire for security,
transparency and stability in government and operations.Taken together,
these preferences for a clean, well-run countries may reect the adoption
by mining rms of a deliberate strategy intended to minimize the risks to
their hugely expensive and immobile investments.
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1 Introduction
The global gold mining industry provides an excellent opportunity in which
to analyze the impacts of di¤erential environmental standards on rm location
decisions. First, investment in this industry has expanded rapidly in recent
decades due to privatization, deregulation and liberalization initiatives which
many governments have pursued since the 1980s. Foreign direct investment
ows in the mining sector have accelerated rapidly in the poorer countries of
the world, buoyed by high world prices for precious metals.
Accelerating opportunities for foreign investment have also brought with
them increasing public concern about the environmental impacts of mining op-
erations worldwide. Concern has focused, in particular, on the implications of
di¤erential environmental standards on foreign direct investment in the min-
ing industry. There is increasing concern that international mining companies
may be motivated to set up operations in poor countries because environmental
regulations are weaker and compliance less strictly monitored. Governments,
eager to attract foreign investment, may themselves weaken  or simply fail
to strengthen  existing regulations and sanctions, in order to attract much
needed foreign investment. In the mining industry, the huge environmental im-
pacts associated with mining operations makes this a very real concern. The
scale and impacts of mining operations impose huge environmental liabilities,
much greater than those faced by other industries. Hence a desire to avoid
such costs could be a signicant component of the multinational mining rms
decision to seek out countries with weaker environmental legislation and lim-
ited institutional and technical capacity to regulate and monitor their polluting
activities.
However, it is also possible that the multinational mining rm views migra-
tion to poor countries as ultimately a bad thing for both their prot margin and
their public image. Locating in such places, which also tend to be both eco-
nomically and politically unstable and undemocratic, may be deemed to be too
risky for their public image. Once largely shielded from public scrutiny, mining
rms have had to adjust to an increasingly globalized world of instant media
coverage, which has fueled public concern over the environmental impacts of
mining and raised expectations of corporate performance and responsibility in
this industry (Ramy 2003). Hence any savings in costs from lax environmental
regulations may pale in comparison to the costs incurred by a negative public
image, even if rms exceed by a wide margin the environmental standards of
their host country. In short, they may decide that their very presence in such
countries involves too much hassle to make it worthwhile.
Taking this argument further, the political and business stability that tends
to characterize environmentally stringent countries may be a far more important
characteristic in a location than the degree of environmental stringency. Once
economic and other nancial considerations have been weighed, what the rm
may desire more than anything else is to be e¢ ciently and fairly treated by its
foreign host, even when it is recognized that environmental policies are likely
to change in the future. In this case, a clean environment may reect the good
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governance that they really crave. Moreover, it is also possible that the costs of
environmental stringency are an irrelevant locational concern for mining rms
simply because they view the adoption of uniform "best practice" standards
around the world as a similar risk minimization strategy designed to inoculate
themselves against huge nancial losses arising from against future changes in
environmental regulations in the host country in years to come.
The extent to which environmental concerns dominate multinational mining
rm location choices is a key focus of this paper. It carries out a systematic em-
pirical investigation of environmental regulations in a¤ecting the international
siting of gold mining rms. It is the rst study to systematically examine rm
location decisions in a natural resource industry. It is also one of the few truly
global studies on rm location decisions. We measure the location outcomes
of multinational gold mining rms as reected in the birth of new mines since
1975. Most studies in the literature are restricted to either intracountry analy-
ses of rm decisions (largely in the USA, EU or China) or to a few developing
countries (e.g. Eskeland & Harrison 2003). Moreover, our data set allows us to
directly observe the multinational decision outcome. The use of disaggregated
data at the nest resolution of industry organization enables us to trace the de-
cision outcome of each multinational to its plant rather than inferring location
preferences from many, quite heterogeneous plants or from aggregate data at
the industry or rm level. The breadth and depth of the data set also allows
us to comprehensively control for a range of important country characteristics
that may potentially inuence choice of mine location.
The study uses both conditional and mixed logit regression approaches to
model rm location decisions in the gold mining industry. Our use of mixed
logit models is motivated by the well known property that conditional logit
models are quite restrictive, requiring an independence of irrelevant alternatives
assumption which is likely to be violated here. Mixed logit models relax this
assumption and (as shown, e.g., in McFadden and Train, 2000) can approximate
well any discrete choice structure. We use Bayesian methods to estimate our
models, the advantages of which are outlined in Train (2003).
The remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a short mo-
tivating description of our study within the context of recent studies on rm
location behavior. Section 3 discusses our Bayesian mixed logit modelling ap-
proach. Section 4 provides a comprehensive description of our data set, and
Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Motivation & Literature Review
Currently, there is much uncertainty in the empirical literature about whether
environmental regulations play any signicant role in rm location decisions.
This literature contrasts with the majority of theoretical studies, which have
consistently demonstrated that a prot-maximizing rm will seek to set up in
areas where the production costs of pollution control, environmentally appropri-
ate inputs/outputs, waste disposal charges, etc. are low. (e.g. Baumol & Oates;
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Copeland & Taylor 1994). However, some theoretical literature has suggested
that environmental regulations do not a¤ect rm location decisions when other
factors such as technology adoption and strategic interaction, asymmetric infor-
mation between countries are considered. Thus, the interplay of these factors
will produce di¤erent outcomes, e.g. a cleaner environment in the host country,
than anticipated by the pollution haven hypothesis (e.g. Wu 1994; Regibeau &
Gallegos 2004).
Most empirical work has concluded that environmental stringency is just one
factor in location decisions, and not a very signicant one, compared to other
country factor endowments such as availability of cheap, skilled labor and quality
of infrastructure.(see reviews by Dean 2001 and Ja¤e et al. 1995). A related
literature indirectly attempts to measure the impact of environmental stringency
on rm behavior through changes in inter-industry FDI or trade volumes or
wage and capital ows. Empirical evidence from rm location decision studies
suggests, at best, a weak role, with later studies inconsistently showing stronger
support not found in the earlier studies. Most of this research has been carried
out on the USA, exploiting the variation in environmental stringency across
states (e.g. Bartik 1989; McConnell & Schwab 1990; Levinson 1996; 1999; List
et al. 2003; Becker and Henderson 2000).
Only a few studies have examined the impact of environmental stringency
on rm behavior which also involves a poor country or set of countries. To the
best of our knowledge only one study has focused at the plant level, the study
by Mani et al. 1996. The authors use a conditional logit analysis to measure
the locational choices of manufacturing plants in the 14 largest industrial states
in India in 1994. The authors nd that agglomeration and spillover e¤ects of
other business activity in areas are important factors in the location decisions of
rms, as are availability of power and low levels of labour disruption. However,
most important for our study, they nd that plant location decisions are not
a¤ected by the level of environmental enforcement at the state level. Interest-
ingly, plant location is signicantly positively related to environmental spending
by government.
Of the studies that focus on FDI ows or outputs in poor countries such as
production and net exports, the evidence for a role for environmental regulations
is much weaker than either plant location or comparable trade/FDI ow stud-
ies within the USA. One such study, by Eskeland and Harrison 2003, examines
the pattern of foreign investment across industries within Mexico, Venezuela,
Morocco and Cote dIvoire. They nd that abatement costs are not signicant
determinants of the distribution of foreign investment among manufacturing in-
dustries within countries. Foreign ownership appears to be quite signicantly
associated with lower energy use, the studys proxy for pollution intensity. Sim-
ilarly, Smarzynska and Wei (2001) evaluate the foreign investment choices of
multinational rms in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union using a rm-level
data set on investment projects and pollution output in 24 transition economies.
They nd weak support at best for the possibility that environmental laxity may
might lead to more foreign investment. Support is strongest when environmen-
tal regulation is measured by participation in international treaties. In this
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case, investment by pollution-intensive industries as a share of total inward FDI
is lower in countries with greater participation. However, the authors caution
that support for this association is not robust to various sensitivity checks and
the sample size of countries is small, thereby limiting the amount of measurable
variation in environmental protection.
Similarly, in an analysis of 2,886 equity joint venture projects during 1993-
96, Dean, Lovely and Wang (2005) measure whether such ventures are a¤ected
by environmental levies on water pollution. Using conditional logit and nested
logit models, they nd that environmental stringency has no impact on location
choice. The only exception is joint ventures in highly polluting industries in
conjunction with partner rms from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan but not
from the OECD. Industries from countries in the latter were not attracted by low
environmental levies, regardless of their water pollution intensity. Controlling
for the fact that industries with the largest pollution abatement costs will be
less geographically mobile, Ederington et al. (2005), nd a signicant e¤ect of
pollution abatement costs on imports from developing countries, particularly in
pollution-intensive, geographically mobile industries.
The inability of the empirical literature to nd strong evidence for a pollution
haven hypothesis as predicted by the theoretical literature might be attributable
to a number of methodological and data drawbacks. Since this study is con-
cerned with plant location decisions rather than FDI or trade ows, our paper
will attempt to address problems in these studies. Specically, existing plant
and rm location studies do not: a) encompass variations in environmental strin-
gency or pollution intensity within a global context due to their restricted geo-
graphical focus. Di¤erences in environmental variation may not be large enough
to be captured in intracountry studies of rm location and so thus inter-country
studies may provide a better indication of rm location preferences from the
perspective of environmental stringency. b) Plant location studies are largely
cross-sectional, and thus may potentially miss important changes in state or
country characteristics that impact on environmental stringency (e.g. changes
in the composition and scale of a countrys industrial base); c) Studies do not
comprehensively control for potentially important non-environmental regulatory
and non-economic factors in rm decision-making, such as political stability and
corruption level of a country, potential for prot repatriation, internal reinvest-
ment policies, rights of tenure, etc.
3 Econometric Methods
The econometric models used in this paper are standard qualitative choice mod-
els, but it is worthwhile to briey dene them to motivate the di¤erence between
conditional and mixed logit. Such models can be motivated by assuming that
mining companies will choose locations where they will maximize their utility
(which could just be prot or could be more broadly dened to reect other rm
objectives). In our data set we have 700 new mines opening in 55 countries. To
treat each of the 55 countries as a separate location choicewould lead to a
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model with too many coe¢ cients to be estimated well with a data set of this
size. Accordingly (and as we motivate below), we collapse our 55 countries in 11
country groups. The choice of country groups is largely made on geographical
grounds, but we also strive to ensure that countries within a group have very
similar values of the explanatory variables and, in Appendix B, we investigate
how robust our results are to our denitions of country groups.
Formally, let Uij be the utility that rm i (for i = 1; :::; N) gets from opening
a mine in country group j and xj be a vector of explanatory variables containing
characteristics of country group j. If we let:
Uij = 
0
ixj + "ij ;
where "ij are i.i.d. extreme value random variables and i are i.i.d. N (b;W )
random variables then we have the mixed logit model. Train (2003) provides
a thorough discussion of the properties of this model. The conditional logit
model is a restricted variant of the mixed logit model which imposes that the
same coe¢ cients hold for all rms (i.e. i =  for i = 1; ::; N). The conditional
logit model su¤ers from the well-known independence of irrelevant alternatives
assumption. In our study of choice between country groups (or indeed any
similar study), this assumption is very likely to be unreasonable. For this reason,
although we do present conditional logit results as a familiar benchmark, we
place emphasis on the mixed logit model. The mixed logit model is much more
exible than the conditional logit model. Indeed, as shown in McFadden and
Train (2000), any discrete choice model based on random utility maximization
can be approximated arbitrarily well by a mixed logit model.
With the mixed logit model, there is a di¤erent set of coe¢ cients for each rm
(i.e. i for i = 1; ::; N). It would be too much to present empirical results for
each of these coe¢ cients. Accordingly, following standard practice, we present
the mean of the distribution, b, as a measure of the average marginal e¤ect of
each explanatory variable on the utility.
Our econometric methods are described in Chapter 12 of Train (2003). This
chapter describes how to carry out Bayesian inference (with a noninformative
prior) in the mixed logit model as well as motivating why Bayesian methods
have desirable properties for this model.1
3.1 Data
3.1.1 Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable is the location decisions of 700 gold mining rms through-
out the world using data on year of mine opening (mine births). Although we
also have data on mine closings, which could be used a location indicator of the
sensitivity to environmental regulations, we use the opening year of new mines
instead as our dependent variable. As Levinson (1996) notes, existing plants
1We use the MATLAB program for Bayesian estimation of the mixed logit model provided
on Kenneth Trains website (http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~train/software.html) and we thank him
for making this code publicly available.
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will have already incurred large sunk costs and thus environmental regulations
will have less of an e¤ect on existing mines than the decision to invest in new
mines. If protable, existing mines will likely close only if new environmental
regulations incur large costs. New rms will be more sensitive to even minor
regulatory changes, ceteris paribus. In addition, unlike manufacturing plants,
which can conceivably stay open as long as they remain protable, all mines
have a natural lifespan. Hence a mine closure measure would not be able to
distinguish between sensitivity to environmental costs and depleted deposits.
Finally, new mines typically do not enjoy "grandfather clause" exemptions from
new regulations that often apply to existing mines.
We observe the opening year of each mine from 1975 until 2013. Obviously
some mines have yet to open and thus are not operational. However, this subset
comprises an extremely small number (25) of mines in our sample. For these
rms, the decision to open a mine in a particular country has already been made.
Dened in the industry as "pre-operational" these mines are in various stages of
construction. However, given our focus is on the location decision rather than
the operational mine, it is reasonable to include these few mines in the study.
Rather than measuring the actual year of opening for the mines in this small
subset, we measure the year in which the decision to set up a mine in a given
country was made. This is the year that the mine was given the designation
"pre-operational" in company reports, rather than simply being contemplated
(i.e. the exploration stage).
Mine births were derived from a proprietary database collected by Raw Met-
als, a mining industry database used by mining rms and investors (Raw Metals
2007).
3.2 Country Groupings
We group mine openings in countries throughout the world. We do this because
the number of country locations modelled in our study 55 countries in all each
measured as a single choice would lead to far too many parameters to reasonably
estimate our model. In a global study like ours it is desirable to include as many
country alternatives as possible (ideally each of our 55 individual countries would
be an alternative location). However, with so many countries it is di¢ cult to
obtain accurate econometric estimates with so many alternatives and a nite
data set. However, given that many countries are quite similar to each other,
it is sensible to think that they are very similar in respect to the decision to
open a mine. We have carefully chosen our di¤erent country groupings with this
tradeo¤ in mind:
a) 11 Country Groupings. In this grouping we reduce our 55 countries to 11
di¤erent groups. This is a relatively large number of groups, but not too large
to preclude reasonable econometric estimation. It groups countries according
to World Bank regional classications, which we slightly modify. That is, we
include the worlds biggest and most established gold mining producer countries
in their own group rather than in their corresponding World Bank regional
group. In other words, Canada and the USA are included alongside South
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Africa, New Zealand and Australia rather than being placed in North America
or sub Saharan African regional classications, respectively.
b) 8 Country Groupings. To try to get even more precise results (and
to check if our results are robust) we experimented with further reducing the
number of groups of our 55 countries. Our 8 country grouping retains the
separate grouping for the big gold mining producing countries of the above, but
combines the Latin America and Carribean classications of the 11 groups into
one group. It also combines Southeast Asia, East Asia and Oceania (excluding
Australia and New Zealand) into one group.
c) 2 Country Groupings. Rather than divide countries according to their re-
gional classications, this grouping is a very coarse adaptation of a classication
based roughly on the World Banks income classications. We collapse their
income categories of low , middle, and high as they were in roughly the middle
of the sample (1995) into two coarse groupings: Very high income (highly devel-
oped) North America and Western Europe, and everbody else (low to middle
income) The exception to this grouping is that we place the established pro-
ducer, South Africa, into the same group as the other established producers, all
of which fall into the income category of "highly developed" countries.
From the point of view of the mining executive, our regionally based group-
ing makes sense. Indeed mining executives are used to making decisions on a
regional basis. Most organize their corporation according to regional divisions.
Moreover, it is not uncommon for ore bodies of economic importance to strad-
dle one or more countries in geographical proxmity to each other. One example
is the Pascua-Lama ore body, which straddles Argentina and Chile. Owned
by Canadian multinational, Barrick Gold, it is located in the Frontera District
close to the companys Veladero mine. The company also opeates other mines
in its South American division, which comprises the countries of Chile, Peru
and Argentina. However, even when conned to individual countries, mining
often depends on the presence of regional agreements among countries, in order
to ensure the free ow of movement of ore to ports and other transportation
routes.
Moreover, the countries comprising our regions share more than just geolog-
ical characteristics of importance to executives. That is, as regional groups they
also tend to be similar in the many institutional, legal, economic and political
factors that may a¤ect location decisons. A good example is Latin America.
During the 1970s mining in the countries making up these regions were charac-
terized by strong state control of the industry, making it virtually impossible for
foreign rms to gain access to reserves. However, beginning in the mid to late
1980s, the countries of these regions began to fully liberalize their mining laws
and implemen deregulation in a wide range of areas impacting on the mind-
ing industry, including land rights and mineral rights, taxation, environment
protection in a bid to attract foreign mining investors. Although a very crude
grouping and less meaningful than regional based groupings, separating out the
very richest countries in our sample from all the rest as we have done in 2 coun-
try grouping, reects the awareness among executives of the many di¤erent risks
that are potentially involved (e.g. poor infrastructure) in setting up operations
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in countries that have fewer resources.
In addition, some countries, while tting other regional groups, have always
been viewed as unique from the point of view of the gold mining industry:
Australia, South Africa, Canada, and the USA have a well-established mining
presence, large reserves, and highly sophisticated production systems. New
Zealand, while not containing the vast reserves that these countries posses,
nonetheless has an established presence in the mining industry and shares many
of characteristics of importance to the mining industry with these countries,
including sophisticated technologies and similar business, infrastructural and
institutional features.2 Together the members of this group account for the
majority of the output of the worlds gold, and producers within these countries
are also big players overseas (e.g. Goldcorp in South Africa).
A list of the countries comprising our 11country groupings is available in
Appendix A. Our 8 and 2 country groupings simply modify these groups in the
ways indicated above.
3.2.1 Explanatory Variables
We include many explanatory variables found in other studies to be associated
with plant location decisions: labour costs, market size and accessibility, tax
rates, market openness. In addition, we include variables designed to capture
aspects of the political stability and degree of corruption of each country. As
discussed in the introduction, the latter conditions have been identied as being
important in respect to the increasing risks, public expectations, and competi-
tion the global mining industry faces. We also include variables that proxy the
environmental regulatory costs that rms face in each country. Finally, we also
include a mining industry specic "risk" variable, which rates each country on
a wide range of risk factors a¤ecting mining. With a few exceptions (see below)
data are observed for 1975 to 2013. For the few mines (25) whose opening is in
the future, we assign values for these variables based on the year in which the
decision was made to set up the mine.
Since our explanatory variables are based on groups of countries rather than
individual countries, we take the average value of all the countries in our groups
to obtain an aggregate measure. We would argue that this is a reasonable
strategy given that no country within each group di¤ers widely in respect to the
characteristics of interest that we measure. Data are derived from a variety of
o¢ cial and private sources, as specied below:
a) Investment. Unlike manufacturing and other industries, mining is an
extractive activity largely carried out in enclaves and for export rather than
domestic markets. Hence rather than measure domestic market size, we measure
the average % of each groups exports comprised of non-ferrous mineral ores.
Data for this variable (OREEXP) was derived from the WTOs International
2Some might object to including New Zealand in this category, but we would argue that it
is more similar to this group in all but the size of its reserves. However, we should also note
that only 1 mine in our sample is located in New Zealand.
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Trade Statistics (WTO 2007). It is a measure of the average of non-ferrous
metal mining production in each country group.
We also include two variables designed to measure the average openness
of the group to foreign investment and trade: a) average investment share of
real GDP per capita (INVEST) and average percentage of GDP in total trade
(OPEN). Both variables are from Summers et al. (2006) and are measured in
constant 1996 prices. The rst variable was obtained by dividing investment
share by real GDP plus exports minus imports. The latter variable was mea-
sured as exports plus imports divided by real GDP per capita in constant 1996
US prices. Although we do not have su¢ cient time series data on labour costs
for all our country groups, we do have data on the productivity of labour. This
is a good proxy for average relative labour costs for each group, and an impor-
tant variable in its own right for mining rms, which depend on skilled labour.
This variable (GDPPERW) was derived from a census denition of economi-
cally active population as reported by the International Labour Organization.
It was created by dividing average real GDP income in constant US 1996 dollar
prices for each group by the percentage of each groups population dened as
economically active, reported in the International Labour Organization.
b) Infrastructure. Energy costs are a potentially signicant factor for rms
seeking to set up gold mining operations in a country. Although we do have
data on industry electricity costs since 1975, the data are very incomplete,
both within and across countries. Similarly, we lack su¢ cient data on power
shortages, which have been found in Mani et al. 1996 to be signicant factors
in rm location decisions of manufacturers. We also lack complete worldwide
data for the periods covered in our study on road and train networks, which
would also be an important infrastructural characteristics for the industry. We
do, however, have nearly complete data on the % of a countrys population
subscribing to telephone services, which we average for each group. This is our
proxy for measuring the general quality of a country groups infrastructure It
is derived from Estache & Goicoechea 2005 and is designated by the acronym
PHONE.
c) Environmental Stringency. We include two measures to gauge the level of
environmental stringency in a country. Most plant location studies have had to
resort to treaty-based measures, such as whether a country is signatory to inter-
national treaties (e.g. Smarzynska & Wei 2004). IGiven the dearth of compa-
rable cross-country environmental regulatory data, we also use proxy variables.
However, in contrast to others, ours measures actual environmental quality and
performance rather than intentional. The rst one is an index value measuring
the various aspects of a countrys environmental quality and performance. It
is one of the only global measures of environmental quality and performance.
The index is measured between 0 and 100, with 0 being the worst performance
and quality and 100 the best. Environmental health and ecosystem vitality are
gauged using sixteen indicators of policy relevance: Air quality, water resources,
biodiversity and habitat, productive natural resources, and sustainable energy.3
3The index is also signicantly correlated with di¤erent measures of good governance in-
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The environmental performance indicator (ENVPERF) was derived from the
Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy (YCELP) and the Center for
International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) of Columbia Uni-
versity (2006). Data for each indicator used in the construction the index came
from a variety of sources, many of them compiled for various years in the 1990s.
More information can be found in CIESIN & YCELP (2006). For this variable
we have only one observation for each country for which we took the average
of the group as a whole. Although far from ideal, we stress that the data can
nonetheless give us a meaningful measure of a groups environmental quality
and performance, as the factors that make up the index will not qualitatively
change over time.
Our other environmental stringency variable is also a proxy measure, and
is observed since 1975. This is a measure of each groups SO2 production per
capita as a proportion of US per capita emissions (SO2). We express national
emissions per capita as a proportion of US measures in order to counteract any
environmental Kuznets curve impacts of growing emissions over time due to
falling or rising real GDP. SO2 emissions. Data for this variable were derived
from Stern (2005), who also provides details on its measurement and sources.
Real US GDP data used to construct our measure were derived from Summers
et al. 2006.
d) Political Stability. Due to their substantial capital investments, it is
di¢ cult for mining rms to disinvest from a country without incurring a huge
loss. For this reason mining is more susceptible to the risks inherent in unstable
countries than other industries. Accordingly, they may weigh political and social
factors far more heavily than do manufacturing industries. In contrast, man-
ufacturing industries are characterized by a high degree of footlessness. They
can respond to unstable political changes that may a¤ect their operations. Since
they are relatively liquid they are also much freer to set up operations in other
country at comparatively low cost. In contrast, mining companies must incur
high sunk costs and thus are exposed to more risks than mobile operations.
Given the long-term nature of their investments, risk also arises from unstable
governments that may renege on their commitments, seek to nationalize them
restrict their prots, change tax rates, etc.
In our study we have two variables measuring political conditions in each
group: a) a political corruption index and b) a political stability index. The
rst index (CORRUPT) was derived from Transparency Internationals Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index (2007). It measures the perceptions of corruption
based on expert poll perceptions of public sector corruption by business people
and country analysts. Countries are assigned a score between 0 and 10. Zero is
the highest perceived level of corruption and 10 the lowest. Our data are from
1980 onwards. We assign 1980 values to the ve years preceding and three years
following this period. For 1980-85 and 1988-92, we assign the average value for
cluding e¤ective regulation, controls on corruption, adherence to the rule of law, and vigorous
debate over environmental policy choices. Good governance appears to be a signicant com-
ponent of the variation in environmental quality and performance observed across countries.
For more discussion of the index see CIESIN & YCELP (2006).
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the period to each year due to missing data. For all years after this period we
observe values yearly up until 2007 (which is assigned the 2006 value). Once
again, our measure is the average value of the index for all members of each
group.
Our second variable measures group political stability (POLSTAB). This
variable is coded from the year of the rst regime transition or rst year of
independence. Durability of a regime would be a particularly important measure
for mining industries given the huge investments they make and the relative
immobility of their enterprise. While these risks may be lower in democratic
regimes (e.g. Busse & Hefeker 2005), authoritarian regimes may provide higher
returns to investors (Oneal 1994) simply because they can provide predictability
and hardfast rules for a rm committed to the country over the long-term.
Such rms may even seek to lobby authoritarian governments as part of a risk
minimizing strategy, in a way that is not possible in democratic regimes. Data
for this variable were derived from the Center for International Development
and Conict Managements Polity IV project (CIDCM 2007).
e) Mining Risk Variable. This variable (MRISK) measures risk factors of
particular importance to the mining industry. Each country in the group for
which an average value was calculated was measured in respect to a wide range
of factors that can a¤ect the potential protability of and stability of min-
ing operations: a) security of tenure, aspects of mining legislation, including
foreign exploration and mining companies rights and operations, availability
and accessibility of geological information and data; legislation a¤ecting mining
and exploration such as landowners rights and access to land, mining taxation
and special investments for exploration and mining; environmental regulations,
particularly the degree of stringency imposed on mining companies; the general
government attitude towards mining and exploration, including legal regulations
and their application; country track record in exploration and mining; and the
status of mining related infrastructure. Other more general factors measured in
this index relate to economic and business issues applicable to all rms oper-
ating in a country (e.g. equity restrictions, controls, economic policy, payment
delays, etc.). The data were derived by the Political Risk Services (PRS 2001).
We have data for 1994 and 2000. For all years up to and including 1994 we
assign countries the 1994 value and for all years afterwards, the value for 2000.
The higher the number the less risky the country group is deemed to be for
mining investment.
f) Location of Head O¢ ce. This variable (LOHO) measures the regional
(and other characteristics, including income proximity) of a new mine to its head
o¢ ce. Since we group countries according to di¤erent groupings, proximity here
is measured in terms of whether the head o¢ ce is also located in that group.
Thus, if a mine was observed to open in the same country group as the head
o¢ ce it was accorded a 1 and 0 otherwise.4
4Recent literature suggests that other considerations may a¤ect rm decisions. Brainard
(1997), for example, argues that maximizing proximity to customers and the need to achieve
economies of scale are two important cost considerations that rms will also weigh when
making decisions about where to locate. Unfortunately, we do not have su¢ cient data to
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4 Empirical Results
In order to investigate the robustness of our results, we do not seek to come up
with one correct specication. Rather we present results using both condi-
tional logit and mixed logit models. Furthermore, we consider various combina-
tions of the explanatory variables. In an appendix, we also exam the robustness
of our results to changing denitions of our country groups. Our motivation for
this strategy is that an empirical result which is found using several di¤erent
modelling strategies is more believable than one which is found with just one. In
this data set, where many of the explanatory variables are correlated with one
another, an explanatory which is found to be signicantwhen included with
one set of explanatory variables, might be found insignicantwith another
set. Thus, presenting results for just one choice of explanatory variables could
be very misleading.
4.1 Conditional Logit Results
Table 1 contains a benchmark set of conditional logit results5 . All our models
contain dummy explanatory variables for each location choice (but for the sake of
brevity we do not present coe¢ cient estimates). In initial experimentation with
this data set, we also included a dummy variable for opening year. However,
these were never signicant in any of the regressions. Hence we only discuss
time e¤ects briey at the end of this section.
For the reader unfamiliar with these models, note that a positive (negative)
coe¢ cient on an explanatory variable means that the higher the value of the
explanatory variable, the more (less) likely the location will be chosen. The rst
column of Table 1 is di¤erent from the others in that it contains the results for
12 di¤erent conditional models, each containing a single explanatory variable.
For instance, the rst row of this column contains the estimate of the coe¢ -
cient on POPDEN in a model which contains only POPDEN (and the dummy
measure these location concentration trade-o¤s in our data set. Even if available, they would
be di¢ cult to measure in a study with as many location alternatives as ours. For instance,
the nature of our location decision study would require, as an example, that we get data on
"how close Mine X was to a highway or a port". But, for every other country, we would have
to have a value for this variable; that is, we would also have to know: "How close would Mine
X have been to a highway if it were located in Australia", "How close would Mine X have
been to a highway if in South Africa", and so forth. Some of this e¤ect will be captured by
the infrastructure measure (% of phone subscribers). Moreover, the market in gold is clearly
an international one and will not be a¤ected by local or even country demand conditions.
Finally, we would argue that these considerations will be far less important in the location
decisions of gold mining rms than, say, manufacturing industries, which by their very nature
are far more "footlose" . While they have a fair amount of choice as to where to locate a
mine around the world, the number of site locations within these countries will be very small.
Bound as they are by the distribution of geological ore within the country, rms will have
little if any choice to concentrate production around but one or several sites at most within
a country. Thus, they must focus on achieving economies of scale in these locations (e.g.
through the use of larger and larger equipment) rather than trading o¤ such achievement
against proximity to customers.
5These are maximum likelihood estimates produced using Stata.
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variable for each location choice), the second row contains the estimate of the
coe¢ cient on OPEN in a model which contains only OPEN (and the dummy
variable for each location choice), etc. All other columns represent a single con-
ditional logit model with the indicated set of explanatory variables. Column
2 is perhaps the most interesting as it contains results from a regression of all
the studys explanatory variables. The other columns provide representative
regression results indicative of the general patterns found throughout the study,
with a particular focus on the political and environmental variables.
***Insert Table 1 Here***
Looking at Table 1, we nd that most of the key results are robust across
di¤erent choices of explanatory variables. The strongest results are for the lo-
cation of home o¢ ce variable (LOHO). It is strongly signicantly positive in
all regressions run. This is as expected: A rm is more likely to set up a mine
in the same group as its home o¢ ce is located. Mining risk (MRISK) is also
positive and highly signicant as it was in almost every regression run. This is
also as expected (recall that this variable has higher values implying less min-
ing risk). Similarly, the estimated coe¢ cients on political stability (POLSTAB)
were positive in all regressions, but were not always signicant. This is sensi-
ble in that the more stable the government on average, the more likely a rm
is to set up a gold mine there. A similar result holds for the trade openness
variable (OPEN). Its coe¢ cient was consistently positive, indicating that rms
are attracted to groups of countries which have more open trade, but it was
signicant in only the regression including all variables. The variable measuring
corruption (CORRUPT) was consistently insignicant (although its point esti-
mate was always negative, suggesting that the more corrupt countries are on
average the less likely a rm will want to go there). Evidence for an inuence of
population density (POPDEN) in rm location decisions was found to be highly
inconsistent; in some regressions it was negatively signicant while in others it
was positively signicant. GDP per worker (GDPPERW) also showed incon-
sistency in its sign and signicance. It was negative and signicant on its own
but insignicant and of the intuitively correct positive sign when included in
regressions with all other variables; however, in other regressions (not reported
here) excluding various variables it was positive. The studys infrastructural
variable (PHONE) and the ore exports variable (OREEXP), were negative in
regressions on their own as well as highly signicant. In regressions with all
other variables, PHONE was negative but less signicant while OREXP was no
longer signicant and positive.
The two variables of particular interest in the study, environmental perfor-
mance (ENVPER) and SO2 emissions (SO2), provide conicting results. The
ENVPERF variable had a consistently negative sign and in many cases was
signicant in regressions run. Although not as consistently strong as the mining
risk variable, it was moderately strong in signicance in many regressions runs,
implying that after other characteristics of the country groups were controlled
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for the weaker a groups environmental quality and performance (higher num-
bers of this variable imply a cleaner environment), the more likely rms will set
up in the countries making up the group. On the other hand, the other studys
proxy variable for environmental performance and health, SO2 emissions, was
often strongly signicant and negative, implying the complete opposite: the
worse the average environmental quality of countries making up a group, the
less likely rms are to set up operations in them
As noted, we also ran regressions for two other sets of country choices: 2
country groupings and 8 country groupings. Recall that the latter grouping
combines Southeast Asia, East Asia and Oceania (excluding Australia and New
Zealand). As Table 3 in Appendix B indicates, results are not very di¤erent
from those in Table 1 for the 11 country grouping. These ndings suggest that
our original results are robust to changes in country groups.
Similar ndings also obtained when we reduced the country groups to only
two, "developed" (i.e. the worlds leading mining countries and Western Eu-
rope) and developing (or all the rest of the countries in our sample). Results
were qualitatively no di¤erent for the 8 and 11 groups with two exceptions in
the conditional regressions including all variables. The only variable that was
signicant in the regression including all variables was the location of home
o¢ ce variable (LOHO). Moreover, in light of the results of previous analyses,
it is also interesting to note that the environmental performance variable (EN-
VPERF) was signicantly positive rather than negative as before but it was not
signicant. Given the coarseness of this grouping, it is probably not worthwhile
attaching too much importance to these results. However, we note them here
as further evidence that our 11 country groups are generally robust across the
choice of meaningful country groups in all regression runs.
Finally, we also carried out conditional regression analysis of all the 11 coun-
try group dummy variables (i.e. dummy variables for each alternative) plus the
year of opening of each mine times all the dummies. We did this to pick up
any unobserved factors which may be related to the period in which the rm
made the decision to open a mine among the set of 11 country groups. Results
are not presented here for the sake of brevity (but are available on request).
We note that results are less signicant than previous results for the 11 country
groups, due to the greater number of country coe¢ cients to estimate. However,
it is worthwhile stressing that results of our 11 country groupings also remained
robust to the inclusion of opening year (interacted with dummies) and that not
much more stands out to report for this part of the analysis.
4.2 Mixed Logit Results
This section reports results from the mixed logit analysis. Table 2 presents
results for the same sets of explanatory variables as Table 1. As discussed in
Train (2003, Chapter 12) mixed logit models tend to be di¢ cult to estimate
since they are parameter-rich. For this reason, coe¢ cient estimates tend to be
less precise. Nevertheless, from a purely statistical point of view, the mixed
logit model is strongly favored. With noninformative priors, Bayes factors (the
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standard method of Bayesian model comparison) run into Bartletts paradox
and should not be used. However, information criteria can be given a Bayesian
interpretation and can be used for model selection. Since the log-likelihood for
any of our mixed logit models is several hundred higher than the correspond-
ing conditional logit model (i.e. the model with the same set of explanatory
variables), all of the standard information criteria select the mixed logit model.
At a very general level, mixed logit results are similar to conditional logit
results (although coe¢ cients are less precisely estimated with mixed logit which
leads to some loss of robustness of results). However, Table 2 and Table 1
di¤er in a few aspects that are worth noting. First, the coe¢ cient on our
environmental performance variable is now consistently positive and signicant
in nearly every regression reported (as it was in every regression we ran). Hence,
the mixed logit model yields results that are quite di¤erent from the conditional
logit model in respect to this key variable. This result now accords with that of
the SO2 emissions variable in the conditional logit analysis. Moreover, as in the
latter analysis, the SO2 variable retains its negative sign in regressions including
other variables and is signicant in the regression including all variables (as it
was in virtually every regression run). The ore export variable (OREEXP) is
now highly signicant and positive, indicating that countries with higher levels
of ore export, the studys proxy variable measuring the degree to which mining
is an established economic activity in a country, are more likely to attract new
mines.
One of our key research questions is: Do mining rms choose to open mines
in countries with poor environmental records and regulations in order to avoid
the costs associated with pollution management?". Our empirical results do
not provide us with a totally clear, unambiguous answer to this question. But,
overall, we would argue that our empirical evidence indicates that the answer to
this question is no. The coe¢ cients on most of our environmental explanatory
variables indicate that rms, if anything, choose to open in countries which
(ceteris paribus) have good environmental records. The main evidence against
this argument is found for the environmental performance variable in Table 1,
but this result is over-turned when we use the mixed logit model.
Findings for all other variables are qualitatively the same as in the con-
ditional logit analysis. In particular, results for the regression including all
variables indicated that the coe¢ cient for group political stability (POLSTAB)
remains positive and signicant, as it was in virtually every regression run. Once
again, country groups population density (POPDEN) and proportion of its pop-
ulation owning a phone (PHONE) on are negative and signicant, suggesting
that country groups with high levels of these characteristics do not signicantly
a¤ect rm decisions about where to locate. These ndings were consistent
throughout the regression analysis for results not reported here. Similarly, in
the regression with all variables, the group investment variable (INVEST) was
negatively signicant as in the conditional logit analysis. The exception to this
nding is the regression including all variables, where it was both positive and
signicant. The consistently negative and weakly signicant nding for this vari-
able was also repeated in regressions with other variable combinations. Mixed
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logit results indicated that groups of countries with high levels of foreign invest-
ment on average are slightly less likely to attract foreign mining rms. However,
the openness to trade variable was a stronger factor in the mixed logit analysis,
as was evidenced by its positive and signicant coe¢ cient in the regression with
all variables (and other regression runs not reported). The worker productivity
variable (GDPERW) also showed more consistency of result than in conditional
logit model. It was both positive and highly signicant in the regression in-
cluding all variables (a pattern that repeated itself throughout the regression
runs).
5 Discussion & Conclusion
This paper has used both a conditional logit and a mixed logit regression ap-
proach to empirically analyze the location decisions of the worlds major gold
mining rms. It used a panel data set of political, economic, regulatory and
nancial variables observed for a large number of gold producing countries since
1975. The aim of the study was to determine the signicance of environmental
stringency in forming rm location decisions while controlling for other poten-
tially important variables that may a¤ect such decisions. Using the birth of new
mines as its dependent variable, the study found mostly consistent and robust
location country characteristic preferences among multinational gold mining
rms. These ndings paint an interesting picture of an industry that has strong
preferences for countries that are not only close to home, politically stable, open
to trade and productive, but also provide for low levels of nancial risk and high
levels of stability and predictability in mining operations. They also appear to
prefer countries with clean environments, ceteris paribus, but this evidence was
not as uniformly robust as these other characteristics.
Specically, taking into account both conditional logit and mixed logit results
for all our di¤erent country groupings, we found consistently strong and positive
evidence for proximity of home o¢ ce in a¤ecting location decisions: Countries
which saw the birth of new mines were also signicantly likely to be in countries
closest to where the mines head o¢ ce was located (or shared their income
levels and in the case of the big producer group including South Africa, USA ,
Australia, New Zealand and Canada were established gold mining producers).
They were also signicantly likely to be countries with high worker productivity,
and high levels of political stability. Moreover, they were also countries that
provided low levels of risk in respect to factors of importance to the mining
industry (e.g. security of tenure, low taxes, repatriation of prots, and so on).
Interestingly, mining rms do not appear to be attracted to countries with
high population densities or with large amounts of foreign investment but a
countrys openness to trade appears to be an important factor. Firms loca-
tion decision does not depend, in other words, on the presence of other foreign
investors in other industries, including resource (e.g. sheries and forestry).
Similarly, the quality of a countrys infrastructure does not appear to be a pos-
itive drawing factor for mining rms. However, the presence of an established
17
and large mining industry in the country is. These negative ndings may reect
the largely enclave nature of the gold mining industry. In the case of population
density, this may negative nding may also reect the fact that environmental
impacts (and thus potential costs faced by the rm) will be greater in heavily
populated areas or may simply reect the high cost of land in these areas (Mani
et al. 1996).
Moreover, infrastructural requirements for the gold mining industry may
be best described by the studys phone variable. Indeed, it may be that, for
many gold mining rms (which typically provide their own roads and associated
infrastructure), having a good infrastructure, especially telecommunications, is
associated with country characteristics that are not as important as they are
for industries such as manufacturing and services. While rms prefer to stay
away from corrupt countries, corruption appears to be far less important than
politically stability, e¢ ciency and transparency in laws, favourable tax policies,
and so on. Perhaps this is because even the risks of corruption can be minimized
if the "rules of the game are known". Hence rms may treat it as simply another
"cost of doing business".
In summary: Our results suggest that gold mining rms seek security, con-
sistency and stability both from a business and a political point of view, and
prefer to stay close to home. Their preference for environmentally clean and
non-corrupt areas, while not as consistently strong, may itself reect an under-
lying desire for the characteristics associated with good governance (Mani et
al. 1996). It may also reect the adoption of a deliberate risk management
strategy by rms. That is, it is possible that the multinational gold mining
rm may actually view their presence in dirty corrupt countries as a bad thing
for their public image, ultimately damaging to their prot margins, despite any
short-term cost savings from lower environmental standards. Such a desire be-
comes more understandable in light of the increasingly globalized environment
in which mining rms have had to operate in the last two decades, one char-
acterized by ever growing public and governmental expectations of corporate
performance and social responsibility. Or it could simply be that environmen-
tal costs really are not paramount factors in mining rms location decisions,
because they adopt uniformly best practice standards anyway, irrespective of
their location. This may itself be another risk minimization strategy aimed at
inoculating themselves against possibly burdensome nancial losses in years to
come, as regulations in the host country become more stringent. Such strategies
make rational sense given their hugely expensive and immobile investments.
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